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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
It is well known that the professional conduct of lawyers is gov-
erned by an elaborate set of legal rules. It is also well known that the
actual conduct of lawyers, taken as a whole, falls short of what the
rules require. A criticism of the rules is that they countenance ag-
gressive and hurtful behavior that should not be permitted. Another
criticism is that lawyers, in their professional conduct, are not faith-
ful to the spirit of the professional rules, which reaches above and
beyond the letter of the law.
These dissatisfactions with the ethics of the profession have pro-
voked several responses intended to remedy, or at least ameliorate,
the deplorable situation. One remedy is to adopt more exacting rules
and more effective machinery for disciplinary enforcement. A second
remedy is to adopt "codes of civility," intended to formalize stan-
dards of conduct at a level above the obligatory rules. A third set of
remedies includes various endeavors aimed at improving what may
be called the legal profession's institutions of ethical nurture and
support. In general, these developments are commendable. I have se-
rious reservations about the desirability of "codes of civility," but
surely the provision of increased resources to disciplinary enforce-
ment is warranted, as are efforts to strengthen institutions that nur-
ture higher levels of professional ethics.
There are other appropriate responses to the perennial "crisis at
the bar" as well. Among them is seeking a clearer understanding of
the relationship between professional ethical standards and profes-
sional practice. This relationship is between the formal norms that
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govern lawyers in their profession and the actual behavior of lawyers
in practicing their profession. Such is the nature of the present
inquiry.
There are basic steps to this inquiry. First, in considering the rules
governing the lawyer's office, it is important to consider not only the
rules that regulate lawyers but also the rules that confer special pow-
ers on lawyers. By rules of empowerment I mean rules such as those
conferring on lawyers the right to conduct litigation in matters not
involving their own personal interests. These rules of empowerment
are what make special regulatory rules necessary.
Second, in contemplating the rules, a shared sense of realism
about the structure and functions of the legal profession is necessary.
The operative significance of the rules, both those of regulation and
those of empowerment, is determined to an important extent by the
lawyer's situation in practice. For example, a lawyer representing a
respectable business corporation from a position in a large estab-
lished law firm is in a different practice situation than a lawyer in a
small firm doing primarily criminal defense or domestic relations
work. Whatever a lawyer's situation in practice may be, that situa-
tion is located in a normative milieu far more complex than that
specified in the codes of professional ethics. The lawyer's normative
milieu includes norms of work setting, family and community, and
subjective religious and personal moral predispositions. Given these
variables in ethical context, the ethical possibilities open to a lawyer
are highly situation specific. Indeed, in a strict sense, each lawyer's
ethical possibilities are unique.'
From the choice-making viewpoint of the lawyer, therefore, the
realm of professional ethics is not a rule-determined domain. Rather,
it is a domain where the lawyer has pervasive marginal discretion
guided by a few fundamental legal rules and constrained by circum-
stances of practice.2 Discourse on professional ethics typically ad-
dresses ethical duty. I suggest that we also look at the same problem
in terms of ethical opportunity.
This approach delivers bad news and good news. The bad news is
that the legal profession must accept the prospect that there are seri-
ous and intractable limitations on successfully improving general
standards of professional ethics by changing the rules or by more
rigorously enforcing the rules as they stand. It may also be bad ti-
I. See Hazard, My Station as a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. L. REv. 1 (1989).
2. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988).
Professor Simon develops well the proposition that lawyers have ethical discretion in
lawyering and, therefore, moral responsibility for the ways in which they exercise that
discretion. If this proposition were not disputed so tiresomely by members of the profes-
sion, it would not require reiteration. At the same time, I believe Professor Simon gives
inadequate attention, or at least inappropriately unsympathetic attention, to the con-
straints to which lawyers are subject in exercising ethical choice.
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dings, if not news, that lawyers are morally responsible for their ac-
tions, if for no other reason than that they do not have to continue
being lawyers.
The good news is that emphasis on ethical opportunity can open
moral possibilities not yet adequately explored. Lawyers can find ful-
filling ethical opportunity in law practice, not because their vocation
is unambiguously virtuous, but precisely because it is not unambigu-
ously virtuous. Apart from this purely personal vantage point is the
prospect of ethical opportunity for the bar as a group. Nurturing
institutions that enlarge and encourage ethical opportunity in the
practice of law may yield better returns than we have assumed.
Poorly run courts and poorly run law firms conduce to bad forms of
professional conduct, while well-run courts and law firms provide a
foundation for more exemplary professional conduct. On the one
hand, it is time to recognize that substantial changes in standards of
professional ethics are, like personal virtue, beyond the reach of legal
compulsion. On the other hand, fuller realization of exemplary con-
duct may be achieved by considering professional ethics as not only a
matter of legal obligation but also of volition exercised individually
and collectively under difficult circumstances.
THE LEGAL RULES
The legal profession has had a codified set of professional stan-
dards for a long time. The first formal codification on the national
level was the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons) of the
American Bar Association (ABA). Those Canons were recognized as
more or less official by both courts and bar associations over a sixty
year period. Interpretation and application of the Canons helped le-
gal authorities to elaborate on many important issues. For example,
the old Canons recognized that a lawyer should not be party to a
fraud committed by his client,' a counterpart to rules of law that a
lawyer could be held liable civilly and criminally if he violated that
restriction.4 The Canons recognized a duty of loyalty that was for-
mulated negatively as a prohibition against conflict of interest.5 Case
law articulated the standard to preclude undertaking adverse repre-
sentation in matters "substantially related" to those in which a law-
yer had served another client."
3. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETics Canon 41 (1908).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs Canon 6 (1908).
6. See, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
In some states such as California, the Canons and decisional law
were augmented by statutory provisions regulating the "office" of at-
torney. For example, the California Business and Professions Code
imposes a duty of truthfulness to the court on lawyers.7 This provi-
sion has stood in the books for over a century even though many
contemporary California practitioners seem unaware that they are
governed by such an onerous standard.
It is also well known that in 1970 the ABA promulgated a new
formulation of professional standards, the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Code). The Code made clear that many of the
lawyer's central obligations were unmistakably legal, that is, they
were obligations resting on norms having the force of law backed by
the state's coercion. For example, doubt was removed about whether
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest was a matter of polite sensibil-
ity or one of legal obligation: avoiding conflicts of interest was un-
mistakably made a matter of legal obligation. 8 The distinction be-
tween legal duty and other kinds of ethical obligation was
formalized, if not made fully comprehensible, in the Code's distinc-
tion between Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations.
However, the substantive content of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility was retrograde in some respects in relation to
the realities of law practice. The Code was notoriously oblivious to
Supreme Court decisions concerning access to legal services.9 The
Code also failed to take adequate account of developments in the law
of criminal and civil misrepresentation. Evolution of the law of mis-
representation away from caveat emptor necessarily modified the
lawyer's duties of loyalty and confidentiality toward clients, particu-
larly in securities, real estate, and commercial practice. The bar was
not ready to deal with these consequences.'0
Unfortunately, many of the same problems reappeared when the
ABA took a new comprehensive look at its standards of professional
conduct through the Kutak Commission, which produced the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct."' Nonetheless, though the terms of
the law governing lawyers remain unclear in many respects, it is now
quite clear that lawyers, like everyone else, are governed by binding
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
7. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (West Supp. 1990).
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 to -107
(1980).
9. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (decided before the promul-
gation of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility) with In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978) (holding invalid the application of restrictions on solicitation in the Code).
10. See generally Hazard, Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding inva-
lid advertising restrictions in Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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legal obligations emanating from statutes and decisional law. The
practice of law is governed by a voluminous body of law, which in-
cludes codes of legal ethics; the general law of contract, tort, and
crime; and the common law pertaining to the practice of law as such.
The legal profession usually conceives of this body of law in terms
of the regulatory controls it imposes on lawyers. These regulations
can be subsumed under four broad headings: competence, conflict of
interest, confidentiality, and conformity to law. Under the rule gov-
erning competence, lawyers should not undertake a matter that is
beyond their professional skills; 2 professional malpractice liability
may result if that norm is disregarded. 13 Under the rules governing
conflict of interest, lawyers may not undertake concurrent represen-
tations that involve antagonistic positions between the clients, nor
may lawyers undertake a matter adverse to a former client that is
"substantially related" to one for which the lawyer previously had
been engaged on behalf of the former client. 4 Under the rules gov-
erning confidentiality, lawyers may not reveal client confidences and
should resist, through the attorney-client privilege, attempts by gov-
ernmental authorities to compel testimony concerning communica-
tions covered by the privilege.'6 Under the rules concerning conform-
ity to law, lawyers must conform their conduct to the requirements
of criminal and civil law. For example, lawyers must avoid misrepre-
sentations in court and complicity in client misrepresentations.'
6
However, an inventory of the laws governing lawyers that is lim-
ited to regulatory controls is quite incomplete. The regulatory con-
trols on lawyers are unintelligible except through presuppositions
about the professional activity that these rules regulate, which is the
"office" of lawyer. The "office" of lawyer is not simply a cultural
artifact or a matter of custom, although law practice includes con-
ventions and traditions. The "office" of lawyer is constituted by rules
of positive law. These rules confer great powers on lawyers and cor-
responding opportunities for discretion in exercising the powers.
The basic constitutive rule is that a lawyer is a person who is "ad-
mitted to the bar." Admission to the bar is not simply a ceremony,
nor simply a memorialization of the fact that the applicant has suc-
cessfully negotiated the bar examination. Admission to the bar is the
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1989).
13. See generally R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989).
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-.12 (1989).
15. See id. Rule 1.6.
16. See id. Rule 1.2(d).
legal transformation of a lay person into an officer of the legal sys-
tem, effectuated by law through the act of the supreme court of the
jurisdiction or some similarly constituted authority. The act of trans-
formation empowers the person to appear before all courts in the
jurisdiction and therein to perform acts within the exclusive province
of members of the legal profession. 17 These acts include filing litiga-
tion, conducting trials and appeals, and performing services inciden-
tal thereto such as settlement negotiations.
Lawyers may easily underestimate the enormous leverage of their
power to operate the machinery of litigation. This power is not un-
bridled, particularly in light of such sanctions as those provided in
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 However, assum-
ing that the client has a marginally arguable legal cause or defense,
a lawyer has authority to inflict the full measure of due process on a
prospective antagonist. One of. our most revered judges, Learned
Hand, reminded us of the measure of resulting misery that it is
within our province to inflict: "As a litigant I should dread a lawsuit
beyond almost anything short of sickness and death."'
An important legal incident of the powers of an advocate is an
absolute privilege under the law of defamation for statements made
in or in connection with litigation. 20 The practical weight of this
power should not be underestimated. Consider the kinds of injurious
utterances that can be made about an opposing party in litigation,
the serious consequences that can result from these statements apart
from their effect in court, and the absence of any remedy against a
lawyer, not even a procedure for securing apology. A person who can
cause these consequences without incurring legal liability is exercis-
ing a legal power of great moment.
The other great power conferred on lawyers is the authority to
document out-of-court transactions in law office practice. 21 This is
the "office" of the solicitor, to use the traditional English nomencla-
ture. The powers of the solicitor include formation of economic and
political relationships and creation of the primary legal evidence
whereby such relationships may be proved if legally challenged. Ex-
ercise of these powers is illustrated by organizing a corporation or
executing a real estate transaction. The boundaries of this domain
17. The significance of admission as an advocate is manifested in the consequences
that follow when a person is denied such admission. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438
(1979) (no right of lawyer admitted in one state to be admitted pro hac vice in another
state).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
19. Hand, The Deficiencies of Law to Get at the Heart of the Matter, in 3 ASS'N
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 87 (1926).
20. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 230-32 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978) (unautho-
rized practice of law in divorce documentation by nonlawyer).
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are less well marked than in litigation, for the definition of the "un-
authorized practice of law" is notoriously fuzzy as applied to office
practice.22 Nevertheless, the power to document transactions in-
cludes, without question, the classic tasks of the conveyancer and the
scrivener in an array of transactions running from corporate finance
to family mediation to lobbying the legislature.
Lawyers have no legal monopoly in this domain except in certain
narrow traditional functions such as the preparation of deeds and
wills. The function of documenting transactions nevertheless is domi-
nated by the legal profession. This position of dominance is founded
on a legal rule. I am referring, of course, to the attorney-client privi-
lege.23 The special powers of lawyers in documentation of transac-
tions flows not from a legal monopoly over the activity, as in the case
of litigation, but from an auxiliary rule of secrecy that appertains
only to lawyers.
The attorney-client privilege protects the secrecy of communica-
tions with lawyers and applies broadly to all types of law office prac-
tice. In this respect, it is instructive to compare the definition of the
term "law practice" applied in the context of the rules governing the
unauthorized practice of law with the definition applied in the con-
text of the attorney-client privilege. Although lawyers have no mo-
nopoly over many services that are arguably "legal," virtually all
services that are significantly "legal" are enshrouded in the secrecy
of the attorney-client privilege if they are performed by a lawyer.
24
Hence, compared with financial analysts, accountants, auditors, so-
cial workers, real estate brokers, and management consultants, law-
yers can provide assistance under a mantle of secrecy qualified only
by the requirement that the transaction not be in furtherance of a
crime or fraud.
While the attorney-client privilege confers no monopoly, it does
confer a franchise that has equivalent practical value. The basic em-
powerments of the "office" of lawyer, therefore, are to use the ma-
chinery of litigation with its potent coercive effect and to plan out-of-
court aggressive maneuvers under the veil of secrecy. Not only are
these empowerments the creature of law but the rules conferring
them are administered by our very own kind, the judges.
22. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empir-
ical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
THE AMBIGUITY OF THE RULES
The rules regulating lawyers and the rules conferring powers on
them are highly ambiguous. Some of the ambiguities are the product
of muddled thinking; others are deliberate. However, most of the
ambiguity in the law governing lawyers results from the law itself
being unavoidably ambiguous. In the more eloquent terminology em-
ployed by Professor Hart, law is "open textured.
'25
Law is no less open textured as it seeks to govern the practice of
law. For example, a lawyer clearly has the power to file a suit that is
well grounded in fact and warranted by current law. 6 But given the
indeterminacy of the governing legal rules, a lawyer also has the
power, for practical purposes, to file a suit resting on no firmer
ground than a client story that cannot be contradicted by indisputa-
ble evidence. The lawyer also is empowered to bring litigation that
has no legal basis except a good faith argument for extrapolation of
the law from its present state at any time. Since the boundaries of
the impermissible are ill-defined, the lawyer's powers of office are
correspondingly broad and legally unconstrained.
Similarly, the scope of the attorney-client privilege runs all the
way to the boundary of the crime-fraud exception on the one hand,28
and to the boundary of the "predominantly business purpose" on the
other.29 The boundary imposed by the crime-fraud exception is fairly
clear in legal concept, but for obvious reasons it is rarely marked by
clear evidence. Evidence of complicity on the part of the lawyer is
often hard to come by, at least if a lawyer is carefully self-protective.
Hence, without legally implicating themselves, lawyers can give
fairly clear signals to clients about operating on the dark side of the
border between legitimate transactions and crimes or fraud. So also,
if a lawyer maintains a clear professional identity when involved in
business transactions, the attorney-client privilege will apply even if
the issues concern business strategy"0 rather than the application of
clearly legal doctrines such as the rule against perpetuities.
Nothing so far has been said of the ambiguity in the regulatory
rules governing the profession. The ambiguity in the rules governing
competence, for example, is manifest in that disciplinary prosecution
for incompetence is sustainable only when the ineptitude is both su-
pine and persistent."' Ambiguity in the rules governing conflict of
25. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
27. The indeterminacy of the governing rule is revealed in, e.g., Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1987).
28. See Hazard, supra note 10.
29. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 251.
30. See Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147-48 (D. Del. 1977).
31. See Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD, L. REv-. 274 (1986).
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interest is manifest in the complexity of the law in disqualification
cases.32 Ambiguity in the rules of confidentiality is manifest in that
many lawyers do not appreciate that they may have to blow the
whistle on a client either in self-interest or out of concern for third
parties. Ambiguity in the rules requiring conformity to law is mani-
fest in that lawyers, with support from some judges, still half believe
that somehow the law at large does not apply to them.33
Enough has been said to make clear that the "office" of lawyer is
a creature of law. Positive law confers important powers on those
who hold the "office," and the scope of those powers is ambiguous in
broad areas around the core definition. This means that a lawyer has
many arguable and therefore assertable powers beyond those ac-
knowledged in a narrow reading of the law constituting his "office."
Put bluntly, the lawyer has wide prerogative to act at will. In one
direction, the lawyer can refuse to go further than clearly authorized
under the powers conferred by the "office." As stated in Model Rule
1.2(c): "A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if
the client consents after consultation.13 4 Further, Model Rule
1.16(b) states: "A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client, or if. . . a client insists upon pursuing an
objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent. 3 5 In
the opposite direction, a lawyer can exercise the powers of the "of-
fice" to the limits of arguable authority and, if desirous of trying to
get away with it, beyond that.
THE LAWYER'S SITUATION IN PRACTICE
Lawyers' broad powers are subject, however, to the practical con-
straints imposed by their situation in practice. A universal constraint
is the lawyer's dependence on the client's objectives and wishes. A
lawyer is an agent, not a principal. Having taken on a client, a law-
yer is not free to pursue the client's objectives only to the extent that
the lawyer may see fit. The lawyer has to go forward to the point
that the client sees fit, within the limits of the law. Openly deviating
32. See, e.g., Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61
TEX. L. REV. 211 (1982); Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the
Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1244 (1981).
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 1, 514 A.2d 114 (1986).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2(c) (1989).
35. Id. Rule 1.16(b).
from a client's purposes is professional disloyalty, and covertly devi-
ating from them involves professional dishonesty as well.36
Client objectives impose substantial constraints on a lawyer's ethi-
cal autonomy. Clients retain lawyers to pursue heavy purposes, hard
purposes, purposes that are manifestly onerous to others. Litigation
involves infliction of direct legal coercion on others. Negotiation in-
volves struggles over money, power, and allocation of risk. Clients
are not well disposed to suggestions that their interests in such mat-
ters are selfish or their objectives unworthy. Recognizing this reality
is not meant to disparage the concept of a lawyer's independence of
professional judgment. On the contrary, recognition that the client's
objectives must prevail, as long as they are within the limits of the
law, makes the concept of independent judgment ethically more im-
portant even while rendering it more complex and elusive. For the
present inquiry, the point is simply that the ethical position of every
practicing lawyer begins within constraints imposed by the client's
objectives.
The aggregate of a lawyer's positions on behalf of clients consti-
tutes her situation in practice. At the outset, I suggested that the
situation of a partner in a large firm representing a bank is different
from the situation of a lawyer in a small firm engaged predominantly
in criminal practice. This merely illustrates a general point: differ-
ences in practice situations strongly determine the operative signifi-
cance to an individual lawyer of the legal constraints and empower-
ments governing the lawyer's "office." ' 37 This is not to say, as is often
suggested, that the constraints and empowerments all favor large
firm lawyers representing banks. The structure of advantage is often,
but not always, so.
The point, for purposes of ethical analysis, is that lawyers' situa-
tions in practice are not all the same. Every lawyer has a unique
measure of influence and power-with other lawyers; with courts
and government agencies; in the bar association; in the business cor-
porate world; in political parties and interest groups; and in religious
communities, civic associations, and local neighborhoods. These dif-
ferences, in turn, affect the effective scope of a lawyer's ethical
discretion.
We have seen that the rules governing the lawyer's professional
36. See, e.g., Fin. General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metgzer, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
37. As demonstrated by the sociology of law practice. See generally J. CARLIN,
LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO
(1962); T. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT (1987); J. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND His COMMUNITY: THE PRACTIC-
ING BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY (1967); J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAW-
YERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COL-
LAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985).
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office are open textured-that they do not and cannot closely regu-
late how the lawyer's "office" is fulfilled. Beyond the unavoidable
indeterminacy of legal rules as such, rules regulating the legal pro-
fession suffer a special indeterminacy arising from the variation in
the practice situations to which they apply. Consider the rules of
competence, for example. If the rules of competence applied to a
profession comprised exclusively of solo practitioners engaged in con-
veyancing, the operative meaning of competence would come to be
fixed in conventions of conveyancing practice. If civil litigation con-
sisted solely of routine automobile cases, the operative meaning of
competence in trial advocacy would assume a similarly established
meaning. However, office practice actually runs from residential real
estate closings to international corporate finance; civil litigation runs
from nuisance claims to corporate takeovers and massive toxic tort
cases.
When the term "competence" is supposed to apply alike to the
work of a small firm practitioner in small town general practice, and
to the work of the metropolitan tax and takeover specialists, the
meaning of the term becomes indeterminate to the point of unintelli-
gibility. So also the rules on conflict of interest would assume more
settled meaning if law practice were limited to conveyancing and
trial of automobile accident cases. Similarly, the term "conformity to
law" cannot mean the same thing when applied to a lawyer special-
izing in trust administration as when applied to a lawyer specializing
in tax fraud cases.
The broad variations in application have similar effects on the
meaning of the empowering rules. If all civil litigation consisted of
automobile accident cases, and criminal litigation was confined to
occasional homicides and embezzlements, the definition of the advo-
cate's powers would take shape in conventions concerning those spe-
cific types of litigation. However, civil litigation in this country in-
volves claims and defenses that can undermine or destroy
businesses38 and political institutions, 9 and full-blown procedural
due process has become the mode in our administration of criminal
justice.
As a consequence, we lack a fine-textured definition of the trial
advocate's authority. The controversy about the advocate's responsi-
38. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (attorney-client privi-
lege applied to internal investigation of illegal payments by corporate officers).
39. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (subpoena of confidential docu-
ments in criminal investigation of President's office).
bility when the client threatens to commit perjury, for example, is an
immediate manifestation of these ambiguities.40 In this perspective,
what looms large to the critical mind is not how far the rules of
professional conduct might go in improving the profession. Rather,
what looms large is the very limited effect that such rules can have,
given the nature of legal rules and the complex contexts of their ap-
plication in our version of modern society.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion seems inevitable: the central problem of ethical re-
sponsibility for lawyers is not whether they can comply with the for-
mal rules of ethics. Complying with the rules is, of course, impor-
tant, and many lawyers seem to have difficulty knowing how to do
so. But compliance with the rules is simply the beginning point.
From there, a broad if not infinite array of possibilities stretches that
cannot be dictated or more than loosely governed by legal rules. As a
consequence, every lawyer's practice situation involves an ethical po-
tential for which that lawyer alone is effectively responsible.
Each lawyer's exercise of ethical judgment and discretion involves
continuous interaction between present ethical opportunities and fu-
ture ethical potential, for no set of relationships is static. Over the
course of time-eventually over the course of a career-some law-
yers develop ethical strength. Others remain about where they stood
upon graduating from law school, unblemished perhaps, but perhaps
also ethically inert. The manner in which a lawyer exercises ethical
opportunity over time establishes that lawyer's ethical standing and
identity. Recognition of this fact may direct greater attention to
ways in which each of us can make fuller and bolder use of the ethi-
cal opportunities that necessarily come our way in everyday practice.
40. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
